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Abstract
Three experiments examined the latent structure of values. Participants rated the importance of values clustered in pairs. Based on
[Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M.
Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 1–65). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.] circular model, we pre-
dicted and found that the time to rate the second value in each pair was shorter when the two values were motivationally congruent or
opposing than when the two values were unrelated (Experiment 1). As expected, this was not the case when participants had to compare
the importance of values within each pair (Experiment 2). Finally, semantic relatedness between values failed to explain the eVects of
motivational compatibility (Experiment 3). Taken together, these results reveal a coherent pattern of value relations driven by motiva-
tional compatibilities, over and above perceived semantic relatedness.
© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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The topic of the present research is at the core of many
debates over social issues and policy. In these debates, peo-
ple often disagree about the compatibility of diVerent social
and policy aims. Can you promote achievement by being
more generous to the needy (e.g., by increasing social bene-
Wts)? Can you promote personal freedoms at the same time
as attempting to protect national security (e.g., through
anti-terror legislation)? Can you promote freedom of
choice while protecting the sanctity of life (e.g., in issues of
euthanasia, abortion, and animal rights). The answers to
these questions depend on access to an underlying mental
representation of how diVerent values and ideals are inter-
related. Our view is that, for the most part, people possess a
common representation of these compatibilities and con-
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diVerences in the relative importance of values and the
methods of pursuing them. The present research identiWes
important limitations of past eVorts to uncover such a
latent mental representation of values and attempts to iden-
tify this representation more powerfully.
Values and Inter-Value Structure
All aspects of individuals’ everyday lives are inXuenced
by human values (e.g., freedom and equality). People rely
on these values by using them implicitly or explicitly to
determine their future directions and justify their past
actions, compare themselves with others, praise or blame
themselves and others, take certain actions over other peo-
ple and inXuence them, and rationalize their attitudes and
behaviour (Feather, 1992; Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973;
Schwartz, 1992). Indeed, this view is built into two of the
most widely used deWnitions of values: Rokeach (1973, p. 5)
proposed that “values are enduring beliefs that a speciWc
mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or
socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of
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21) indicated that values are “desirable transsituational
goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding princi-
ples in the life of a person or other social entity”. Building
on these views, research has found that values are impor-
tant bridging constructs between personality traits and atti-
tudes (Olson & Maio, 2003; Yik & Tang, 1996), and are
among the most important predictors of behaviour and
attitudes (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Maio & Olson, 1995;
Rokeach, 1973). Research has also suggested that values
are somewhat stable and resistant to change (Rokeach,
1985; Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989) but nonetheless sen-
sitive to contextual inXuences (e.g., Maio & Olson, 1998).
Furthermore, values are inter-generationally transmitted
(SchonpXug, 2001; Whitbeck & Gecas, 1988), and cherished
across cultures (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 1994).
Although the enormous set of Wndings related to values
leaves no doubt about the inXuence of basic values on
almost all aspects of human life, it may seem diYcult to
interpret the Wndings within a single nomological net. Inter-
pretation requires a theory about the structure (representa-
tion) of values and value conXicts in the human mind. Early
models about the structure of values (e.g., Feather, 1975;
Rokeach, 1973) laid the groundwork for a comprehensive
structural model provided by Schwartz (1992). The starting
point for this model is the assumption that values are repre-
sentations of three universal requirements of human beings:
individuals’ biological needs, coordinated social interac-
tion, and group eYciency and survival. This assumption led
Schwartz (1992) to form a model of 10 motivational value
types. Table 1 lists the value types, their deWnitions, and
their constituent values. As the table shows, each value type
arises from the three universal human needs and can be
expressed in several abstract values. For example, “benevo-
lence” values are rooted in social interaction needs and
express concern for the preservation and enhancement ofthe welfare of close others, and “self-direction” values are
derived from organismic and interactional requirements
and involve a preference for autonomy, creativity, and free-
dom.
More relevant to our aims, the domains can be
arranged in a circular structure that reXects compatibili-
ties and conXicts between values. In this structure, value
domains that serve compatible motivational goals are
adjacent, whereas value domains that serve incompatible
motivational goals are opposite. For example, as shown in
Fig. 1, values in the benevolence value domain (e.g., hon-
est and loyal) are adjacent to values in the universalism
domain (e.g., social justice and unity with nature), because
both sets of values promote coordinated social interaction
and group survival. Values in the benevolence value
domain are plotted opposite to values in the achievement
(e.g., successful and ambitious) domain, because achieve-
ment values promote personal welfare, rather than shared
welfare with others. In contrast, values that are at right
angles to benevolence values in this circular structure are
held to serve conceptually orthogonal motives for innova-
tion and progress (stimulation and self-direction values)
or personal and group safety (security values). Conse-
quently, people who consider benevolence values to be
highly important should not be more or less likely to con-
sider stimulation or tradition values to be highly impor-
tant. This type of prediction from the circular model has
received repeated support in smallest space analyses of
ratings of the importance of values in over 200 samples
from 60 countries (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000), supporting
Schwartz’s predictions about motivational conXicts and
compatibilities between values. Because this model pro-
vides a single nomological net to merge diverse research
on values across cultures, it could be argued that Sch-
wartz’s (1992) model of value structure is the most impor-
tant recent development in research on values.Table 1
Motivational Types of Values, Adapted from Schwartz (1992)
Value domain DeWnition Motivational values
Achievement Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social 
standards
Successful, capable, intelligent, ambitious, inXuential
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one 
is in frequent personal contact
Helpful, honest, forgiving, true friendship, meaning in life, 
loyal, mature love, responsible, spiritual life
Conformity Restrain actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm 
others and violate social expectations or norms
Politeness, honouring parents, self-discipline, obedient
Hedonism Pleasure or sensuous gratiWcation for oneself Pleasure, enjoying life
Power Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and 
resources
Social power, authority, social recognition, wealth, 
preserving my public image
Security Safety, harmony and stability of society, relationships, and the self Healthy, national security, social order, reciprocation of 
favours, family security, clean, sense of belonging
Self-Direction Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring Freedom, self-respect, independent, choosing own goals, 
creativity, curious
Stimulation Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life An exciting life, a varied life, daring
Tradition Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that 
traditional culture or religion provide
Devout, humble, moderate, detachment, respect for tradition, 
accepting portion in life
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare 
of all people and nature
Social justice, wisdom, protecting the environment, a world 
of beauty, equality, unity with nature, world at peace, broad-
minded, inner harmony
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Despite the abundant evidence supporting the circular
model, there are important limitations on the extent to
which the data actually reveal motivational conXicts and
compatibilities between values. In other words, it is diYcult
to use the available evidence to extrapolate the real struc-
ture of values in people’s minds. One obstacle is presented
by the smallest space analyses themselves, which are limited
in their utility for detecting circular representations (Fabri-
gar, Visser, & Browne, 1997). Nonetheless, a more basic
limitation is that the data rely exclusively on explicit value
judgements. By themselves, explicit value judgements pro-
vide an important tool for identifying value importance,
but their utility is attenuated by the fact that people may
consciously adjust these ratings to be compatible with
salient motives. For example, just as self-report measures of
attitudes and personality can be aVected by socially desir-
able response biases, so too can reports of values (Feather,
1975; Fisher & Katz, 2000; Schwartz, Verkasalo, Antonov-
sky, & Sagiv, 1997).
These value judgements can also be aVected by the desire
to appear consistent to the researcher and to the self. To
maximize consistency, people may adjust their value ratings
to be compatible with their theories about how each value
conXicts with or supports the other values that they have
just rated or are about to rate. People may be guided by
their conscious theories of compatibility, similar to the way
in which people use their implicit theories in autobiograph-
ical recall more generally (Ross & McFarland, 1988). Value
measurements may partly reXect conscious theories about
Fig. 1. The circular model of relations between motivational types of val-
ues (Schwartz, 1994, p.45). Dashed lines are used to delineate the region
occupied by the value type “hedonism,” because Schwartz (1992) indicates
that this value type is related to both of the adjacent value types and can
be considered as part of both.
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Self-Direction conXicts and compatibilities between values, and these the-
ories may or may not reXect the actual conXicts and com-
patibilities within the mental organization of values. This
potential split between conscious theories of mental con-
structs and the actual organisation of them is now a virtual
law of human social cognition (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson,
Blumberg, & Wheatley, 2002; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and
memory (Carroll, Nelson, & Kirwan, 1997; Leonesio &
Nelson, 1990) and provides a powerful argument for exam-
ining the mental organisation of values in a diVerent way.
An additional argument for a novel approach is that the
elicited patterns of relations between values may be driven
more by access to shared semantic associations than by a
parallel access to underlying goals. Quillian (1969) pro-
posed that knowledge about the meaning of words and
concepts is stored in a hierarchical network structure,
wherein the meaning of a concept is deWned partly by its
relations to other concepts. That is, concepts are catego-
rized in nodes in a hierarchical network and their meanings
are deWned not only by concepts stored in each node (e.g.,
canary and yellow), but also by concepts in a higher level of
structure (e.g., bird). As a result, activation of a concept in
memory spreads to connected nodes (Collins & Loftus,
1975; Meyer, 1970), which enable people to judge more
quickly the closeness of concepts when there are fewer
nodes between them than when there are more nodes
between them (Chang, 1986; Gold & Robbins, 1979; Koun-
ios, Montgomery, & Smith, 1994). Also, retrieval of seman-
tically related concepts is quicker than retrieval of concepts
that are semantically unrelated (Collins & Quillian, 1969;
Thomsen, Lavine, & Kounios, 1996).
The implications of this semantic network for the use
of explicit value inter-relations are straightforward. Peo-
ple may begin a value survey by accessing (a) the meaning
of the Wrst value and (b) their motivation to achieve it.
The activation of this value’s meaning should then spread
to values that have highly relevant semantic representa-
tions, including highly compatible and conXicting values.
Ratings of these subsequent values could be adjusted up
or down based on their semantic relations to the original
value. That is, conceptual synonyms should be judged as
being of similar importance, while conceptual antonyms
should be judged as being of dissimilar importance. This
process would not require access to the motivation or
drive activated by each value; motivation could be
accessed only during responses to the Wrst few values (or
even to the very Wrst value alone). In other words, it could
be argued that participants access their motivation
regarding each value only at the outset of the survey and
then use diVerences between their concept meanings to
generate ratings of importance for subsequent values. So,
the circular structure could represent diVerences between
the meanings of values, rather than diVerences in the
actual importance of values as guiding principles in the
individuals’ lives. The present research addresses these
issues by examining the associations between values in
memory.
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Experiment 1 tested the circular structure of values by
examining whether the speed of judging the importance of
a value is aVected by its motivational relation to a previ-
ously presented value, in a manner consistent with Sch-
wartz’s (1992) circular model. Abundant evidence indicates
that the speed of judgement after a prior judgment reXects
the degree of association between the two judgments in
memory (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; RatcliV & McKoon,
1981). Thus, if the circular model reXects the actual organi-
sation of values in memory (and not just conscious theo-
ries), rating the importance of a value should facilitate
faster ratings of a second value more strongly in pairs of
values that the model holds to be highly compatible or con-
Xicting than in pairs of values that are held to be unrelated.
As assumed by the circular model, value distance was
deWned as the number of lower order value domains sepa-
rating the two values in a pair (see Table 2).
Method
Participants
Forty-four undergraduate psychology students (30
women and 14 men) at CardiV University participated for
course credit.
Procedure
Participants took part individually. They were told that
the session included two parts. First, they were asked to
read a list of 48 values from the Schwartz (1992) Value Sur-
vey with the adjacent deWnitions of the values. After 5 min
studying the text, participants were shown 24 trials on the
computer screen, with 4 trials as practice. Each trial
included two values, and each value appeared only onceacross the trials. Table 2 shows each value pair. The same
pairs were presented across participants, but in diVerent
orders across trials. The order of presentation of values
within the pairs was also counterbalanced across partici-
pants, such that participants received either “Domain 1” or
“Domain 2” values Wrst, as shown in Table 2.
Participants were asked to rate the importance of each
value as a guiding principle in their lives, using keys labelled
from 0 (not important to me) to 3 (extremely important to
me). The presentation of the second value occurred imme-
diately after rating the Wrst value. To prevent interference
across trials, participants were asked to count downward
from a speciWc number (e.g., 87) in set decrements (e.g., 3)
for 10 s after responding to each value pair. The starting
numbers and decrements were diVerent across the pairs, but
the same for all participants. Sentences were presented
using Medialab 2002, and reaction times were recorded
using Direct Reaction Time Software 2002, which is able to
record accurately to 1 ms. After completing the experiment,
participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Multiple regression was used to examine the eVect of the
distance between value pairs on the time needed to rate the
second value in the pair. Because our design involved many
trials within-subjects, we could have employed within-sub-
jects analyses and compared results across participants,
between-subjects analyses and compared results across tri-
als, or an analysis that utilized the variance within- and
between-subjects (Michela, 1990). As recommended by
Michela (1990), we chose to perform a curvilinear regres-
sion analysis that examined each trial across participants,
while entering centred value distance, squared centred value
distance (see Aiken & West, 1991), and 43 dummy variablesTable 2
Value pairs that were used in the experiments
Value 1 Domain 1 Value 2 Domain 2 Domain distance Angle as distance
Authority Power Wealth Power 0 7.5°
Creativity Self-direction Daring Stimulation 1 54.5°
Obedient Conformity Helpful Benevolence 2 41°
Having Fun Hedonism Clean Security 3 120.5°
Social-recognition Power Curious Self-direction 4 135.5°
Honest Benevolence Intelligent Achievement 5 170.5°
Family security Security Politeness Conformity 1 8°
An exciting life Stimulation Wisdom Universalism 2 52.5°
Healthy Security Happiness Hedonism 3 80°
Successful Achievement Moderate Tradition 4 111.5°
Broad-minded Universalism Social justice Universalism 0 45°
Detachment Tradition Honouring parents Conformity 1 10°
A Stimulating-Life Stimulation Capable Achievement 2 62°
Humble Tradition Independent Self-direction 3 156.5°
Equality Universalism National security Security 4 103°
Ambitious Achievement Loyal Benevolence 5 128.5°
Enjoying life Hedonism A varied life Stimulation 1 18.5°
Self-discipline Conformity Social power Power 2 114°
Freedom Self-direction Devout Tradition 3 135°
Forgiving Benevolence Pleasure Hedonism 4 174°
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needed to rate the importance of the second value in each
pair. The participant dummy variables helped to control for
between-participants variability in the analysis, while utiliz-
ing all of the participants’ response trials, and made it
unnecessary to control for individual diVerences in
response times to the values.
As hypothesised, the results revealed a signiWcant nega-
tive curvilinear eVect of value distance, B D ¡48.41,
t (753) D ¡2.49, p < .02. The linear eVect of value distance
was not signiWcant, B D ¡12.11, t (754) D ¡.63, ns. As shown
in Fig. 2, participants took less time to rate the importance
of the second value in pairs of values from the same and
opposed domains than from unrelated domains. In other
words, judgements of value importance were facilitated by
prior judgement of a motivationally related value, regard-
less of whether its aim was similar to the target value or
opposed to it. These Wndings support the circular model
(Fig. 3).
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, our examination of value structure uti-
lized an identical prediction for values from adjacent and
opposed value domains. An important exception should
Fig. 2. Experiment 1: the curvilinear eVect of value distance on the speed
of value importance judgments.
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Fig. 3. Experiment 2: the linear eVect of angle value distance on the speed
of value preference judgments.
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t occur when people are asked to choose which of two values
is more important. In this relative judgment task, people
should take longer to decide between two values that serve
similar motives than to decide between two values that
serve opposing motives. In both cases, it would be easy to
access simultaneously the importance of each value in the
pair, but the relative importance should be clearer when the
values conXict. Values that serve compatible motives are
often similar in importance, whereas values that serve
opposing motives tend to be dissimilar in importance (Sch-
wartz, 1992), making it easier to identify the more impor-
tant value in the latter case. Again, as in Experiment 1, the
key variable is not the actual importance of the value; it is
the speed of the judgment. This time, however, a negative
linear correlation between value distance and reaction time
should occur. In other words, we predicted that participants
would take more time to choose between the less distant
values in a pair than between the more distant values in a
pair, with reaction times for moderately distant value pairs
in between.
A second aim of Experiment 2 was to use an additional,
more direct measure of value distance. In Experiment 1, we
deWned value distance as the number of lower order value
domains separating the two values in each pair. This opera-
tionalization relied on Schwartz’s (1992) theoretical group-
ing of values into 10 lower order value domains. A more
precise way of deWning value distances is to measure the
actual angle between the two values of each pair within the
circular structure (see Table 2). We used the angle measure
in Experiment 2.1
Method
Participants
Fifty-two students (33 female and 19 male) at CardiV
University participated for £3 payment.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. They were told
that the study includes two parts. First, they were asked to
read a list of 48 values from the Schwartz (1992) Value Sur-
vey with the adjacent deWnitions of the values. After 5 min
on this task, participants were shown 24 trials on the com-
puter screen, with 4 trials as practice. Each trial presented
one value on the left side of the screen and another one on
the right side. The 20 pairs of values were constructed in the
same manner as in Experiment 1 (see Table 2). Participants
used two keys on the computer keyboard to indicate which
value in each pair was more important to them as a guiding
1 Unfortunately, we were not able to use the actual angles between the
values of each pair as an additional distance measure in Experiment 1, be-
cause we did not record the sequence of presentation of the value pairs,
which diVered randomly between participants. Nonetheless, analyses of
actual angle distances in Experiments 2 and 3 revealed the same eVects as
in Experiment 1. Thus, for the sake of brevity, our description of Experi-
ments 2 and 3 focuses on the more precise angle measure.
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was recorded using Direct Reaction Time Software 2002.
After completing this task, participants were probed for
suspicion and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Similar to Experiment 1, we conducted a curvilinear
regression analysis that utilized centred value distance,
squared centred value distance, and 51 dummy variables
(each representing one participant) as predictors of reac-
tion times to the value choices. Results indicated a signiW-
cant negative linear eVect of value distance, B D ¡350.00,
t (987) D ¡9.01, p < .001, and the curvilinear eVect of value
distance was not signiWcant, B D 45.41, t (986) D .98, ns. That
is, participants took more time to react to trials including
highly related values than to trials including opposing val-
ues, with reaction times to unrelated values falling in
between. These results are consistent with the circular
model, because it should take more time to choose a value
from a pair of values that serve the same motive than
between values that serve opposing, distinct goals of diVer-
ent importance to the individual.
Experiment 3
Thus far, the results of these experiments are consistent
with Schwartz’s (1992) predictions about motivational
compatibility and conXict between values. Nonetheless, the
results do not rule out an eVect of shared semantic repre-
sentations. As indicated in the introduction, we expect that
the circular model is a joint function of latent motivational
compatibility and conXict and of the semantic associations
between values. To provide clearer support for the role of
motivational relations, it is important to show that pre-
dicted value compatibilities and conXicts predict the speed
of value judgement independently of participants’ percep-
tions of semantic relatedness. This issue was investigated in
our third experiment. Experiment 3 addressed this aim
using a paradigm that was a modiWcation of our Wrst exper-
iment, by including our measure of angle distances separat-
ing values and a new measure, which asked participants to
indicate the semantic relatedness of pairs of values. In
Experiment 3, participants completed the value importance
trials from Experiment 1 and then judged the semantic
relatedness of the same value pairs. We expected to Wnd a
curvilinear eVect of value distance on speed of value judge-
ment, as in Experiment 1. Moreover, we expected that this
eVect would remain signiWcant after controlling for partici-
pants’ judgements of semantic relatedness.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight undergraduate psychology students (31
female and 17 male) at CardiV University participated for
course credit.Procedure
Participants took part individually. They were told that
the study included three parts. First, they were asked to
read a list of 46 values from the Schwartz (1992) Value Sur-
vey, with the adjacent deWnitions of the values.2 After 5 min
studying the text, participants completed 23 value impor-
tance trials from Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, reac-
tion times for the second value in each pair were recorded
for our principal analysis. In a third task, participants com-
pleted judgements of the values’ semantic relatedness. That
is, for each value pair, participants were asked to rate the
extent to which the values were related in meaning, using a
4-point scale on the computer keyboard from 0 (not
related) to 3 (extremely related). The speed of this rating
was recorded. After completing this task, participants were
probed for suspicion and debriefed. The instruments for
presenting the trials and recording data were the same as in
Experiment 1, although we also took steps to use the actual
angles between the two values of each value pair as a more
precise measure of value distance (see Footnote 1).
Result and Discussion
We Wrst conducted a regression analysis with centred
value distance, squared centred value distance, and 47
dummy variables (each representing one participant) as
predictors of the speed of rating the second value in each
pair. As expected, the results indicated a signiWcant negative
curvilinear eVect of value distance, B D ¡103.49,
t (766) D ¡4.49, p < .001, and the linear eVect of value dis-
tance was not signiWcant, B D 18.34, t (767) D 1.02, ns.
We then examined the eVect of perceived semantic relat-
edness on the speed of rating the second value in each pair.
In this analysis, we entered centred perceived semantic
relatedness, squared centred perceived semantic related-
ness, and 47 dummy variables (each representing one par-
ticipant) as predictors of the speed of rating of the second
value in each pair. Consistent with the broader literature on
semantic memory eVects, the results revealed a signiWcant
negative linear relation between perceived semantic related-
ness and the speed of rating the second values, B D ¡97.64,
t (810) D ¡5.58, p < .001, strongly supporting the validity of
our measure. We did not expect a curvilinear eVect of
semantic relatedness on reaction times, and this eVect was
not obtained, B D ¡11.90, t (809) D ¡.61, ns.
To further examine the validity of the semantic related-
ness measure, we correlated perceived semantic relatedness
with the discrepancy in value importance between the two
values of each pair. Based on the assumption that semanti-
cally related values should be perceived as similarly impor-
tant, we hypothesized a negative relation between semantic
relatedness and value discrepancies, and this prediction was
supported by our data, r (862) D ¡.26, p < .001. Thus, this
2 The deleted values for Experiment 3 were “detachment” and “honour-
ing parents”.
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ity of our measure of semantic relatedness.3
Our main hypothesis was that the eVect of value distance
on the speed of judgement of the second values would be at
least partly independent of the eVect of perceived semantic
relatedness. A regression analysis tested this prediction by
entering value distance, squared value distance, perceived
semantic relatedness, squared perceived semantic related-
ness (all measures centred), and 47 dummy variables (each
representing one participant) as predictors of the speed of
rating of the second value in each pair. The results indicated
no signiWcant linear eVect of value distance, B D ¡28.82,
t (811) D ¡1.48, ns, but a signiWcant and independent linear
eVect of perceived semantic relatedness, B D ¡112.12,
t (811) D ¡5.75, p < .001. More important, there was an
independent curvilinear eVect of value distance, B D ¡94.90,
t (811) D ¡4.12, p < .001, and the curvilinear eVect of seman-
tic relatedness was not signiWcant, B D ¡20.59,
t (807) D ¡1.03, ns. Thus, semantic relatedness failed to
account for the curvilinear eVect of value distance on the
speed of value judgements.4
General Discussion
The purpose of the present experiments was to investi-
gate the latent structure of social values in memory. Experi-
ments 1 and 2 obtained results consistent with Schwartz’s
(1992) circular model of motivational relations between
values. That is, the experiments found that the speed of
value ratings (Experiment 1) and value preference judg-
ments (Experiment 2) in pairs of values could be predicted
from the compatibilities and conXicts between values in the
circular model. Experiment 3 found that the hypothetical
compatibilities and conXicts predicted the speed of value
importance judgments over and above the eVect of the per-
ceived semantic relations among values.
As we noted earlier, this evidence is important partly
because the circular model has the potential to help inte-
grate a large amount of evidence about antecedents and
consequences of values. Past support for the circular model
relied mostly on theoretically consistent correlations
between self-reports of value importance, and these correla-
tions could have been driven by participants’ conscious the-
3 Additionally, we found that speed of judgement of the second value
was facilitated by smaller discrepancies in value importance between the
two values of each value pair, r(862) D .12, p < .001. The same was also true
for Experiment 1, r(797) D .10, p < .001.
4 Though not directly germane to our assessment of inter-value structure
in memory, we tested whether values that are more closely located in the
circular structure are rated as less discrepant in importance. As expected,
there was a signiWcant positive correlation between value distance and the
absolute magnitude of discrepancies in value importance across value
pairs, r(814) D .07, p < .05. This result also occurred in Experiment 1,
r (818) D .14, p < .001, using the simple count of lower order value domains
that separated values in each pair. These results are consistent with the pri-
or examinations of value structure, which used value distance and self-re-
ports of value importance as variables.ories about value conXicts and by their perceptions of
semantic relations between values. The present data do not
possess these limitations and provide a novel source of sup-
port for the circular model. At the same time, we obtained
evidence regarding two diVerent sources of the obtained
value relations: motivational relatedness and semantic
relatedness. The results provide stronger evidence for a
dynamic conceptual structure of values based on their rela-
tion to motives that vary in compatibility.
Taken together, the results of our experiments strongly
support the validity of Schwartz’s (1992) circular model.
However, this evidence does not indicate that the circular
model is without limitations. For example, Schwartz (1992)
reports that 44 of the 56 values in the circular model show a
consistent location in a speciWed lower order value domain
across cultures.5 The lack of consistency for 12 of the values
suggests that it is important to take cultural and group
diVerences into consideration when it comes to relations
between values and value dependent constructs (e.g., atti-
tudes and behaviour).
Nevertheless, the present results have potential implica-
tions for understanding value-related behaviour. Of partic-
ular relevance is our discovery of close ties in memory
between motivationally compatible values. Given this
result, it is likely that priming a single value should often
activate other related values. As a consequence, value acti-
vation may have complex eVects on value-related attitudes
and behaviours that have not yet been detected. For exam-
ple, priming “national security” may aVect behaviours that
are related to similar conservation motives (e.g., devotion to
a custom or tradition), but are not directly related to the
value itself. This potential impact can be predicted only by
understanding the associations between values in memory.
It is worth noting that such eVects could not be detected
in past research, because past research has focused on acti-
vating one value and measuring one behaviour. For exam-
ple, in past research examining “automaticity” processes in
behaviour, experiments have shown that subliminally acti-
vation of diVerent values can increase the performance of
relevant behaviours that support the value (Bargh, Gollwit-
zer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001; Macrae &
Johnston, 1998). Similar eVects of priming single values
have been obtained in other research focusing on the values
concept (Roccas, 2003; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). In
contrast, our experiments examined a variety of values for
each participant and found that priming a value increases
the activation of closely related values. Nonetheless, it
remains to be seen whether value priming operates in the
same manner when other values are not simultaneously
salient, and it is worth considering that inter-value associa-
tions may vary between cultures and between participants
in a culture. These issues merit further research.
5 Of the 38 values used across our experiments (see Table 2), seven were
not included in Schwartz’s (1992) list of the 44 values that have highly sta-
ble inter-value relations across cultures: having fun, social recognition, in-
telligent, healthy, happiness, detachment, and a stimulating life.
A. Pakizeh et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007) 458–465 465To summarise, the present experiments revealed strong
associations between values in memory that are consistent
with the motivational compatibilities and conXicts posited
in the circular model of values, while showing that per-
ceived semantic relations are not suYcient to explain the
associations between values in memory. These results indi-
cate that it may be problematic to focus on single values in
isolation. Through their existence within a larger motiva-
tional network, the impact of social values on behaviour
may be intricate and far-reaching. The present research
strengthens the empirical foundation for predicting these
diverse eVects.
References
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and inter-
preting interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Bardi, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2003). Values and behavior: Strength and
structure of relations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29,
1207–1220.
Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., & Trotschel,
R. (2001). The automated will: Nonconscious activation and pursuit of
behavioural goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81,
1014–1027.
Carroll, M., Nelson, T. O., & Kirwan, A. (1997). Trade oV of semantic
relatedness and degree of over learning: DiVerential eVects on metame-
mory and on long-term retention. Acta Psychologica, 95, 239–253.
Chang, T. M. (1986). Semantic memory: Facts and models. Psychological
Bulletin, 99, 199–220.
Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. D. (1975). A spreading activation theory of
semantic memory. Psychological Review, 82, 407–428.
Collins, A. M., & Quillian, M. R. (1969). Retrieval time from semantic
memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour, 8, 240–247.
Fabrigar, L. R., Visser, P. S., & Browne, M. W. (1997). Conceptual and
methodological issues in testing the circumplex structure of data in
personality and social psychology. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 1, 184–203.
Feather, N. T. (1975). Values in education and society. New York: Free Press.
Feather, N. T. (1992). Values, valences, expectations, and actions. Journal
of Social Issues, 48, 109–124.
Fisher, R. J., & Katz, J. E. (2000). Social-desirability bias and the validity
of self-reported values. Psychology and Marketing, 17, 105–120.
Gilbert, D. T., Pinel, E. C., Wilson, D. T., Blumberg, S. J., & Wheatley, T.
(2002). Durability bias in aVective forecasting. In D. GriYn & T. Gilo-
vich (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgement
(pp. 292–312). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Gold, J. A., & Robbins, M. A. (1979). Attitudes and values: A further test of
the semantic memory model. Journal of Social Psychology, 108, 75–81.
Kounios, J., Montgomery, E. C., & Smith, R. W. (1994). Semantic memory
and the granularity of semantic relations: Evidence from speed-accu-
racy decomposition. Memory and Cognition, 22, 729–741.
Leonesio, R. J., & Nelson, T. O. (1990). Do diVerent metamemory judge-
ments tap the same underlying aspects of memory? Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 16, 464–470.
Macrae, C., & Johnston, L. (1998). Help, I need somebody: Automatic
action and inaction. Social Cognition, 16, 400–417.
Maio, G. R., & Olson, J. M. (1995). Relations between values, attitudes,
and behavioral intentions: The moderating role of attitude function.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 31, 266–285.Maio, G. R., & Olson, J. M. (1998). Values as truisms: Evidence and impli-
cations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 294–311.
Meyer, D. E. (1970). On the representation and retrieval of stored semantic
information. Cognitive Psychology, 1, 242–300.
Meyer, D. E., & Schvaneveldt, R. W. (1971). Facilitation in recognizing
pairs of words: Evidence of a dependence between retrieval operations.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 90, 227–234.
Michela, J. L. (1990). Within-person correlational design and analysis. In
C. Hendick & M. S. Clark (Eds.), Research methods in personality and
social psychology (Vol. 11, pp. 279–311). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications, Inc.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can
know: Verbal reports on mental process. Psychological Review, 84,
231–259.
Olson, J. M., & Maio, G. R. (2003). Attitudes in social behaviour. In M. J.
Lerner & T. Millon (Eds.), Handbook of psychology: Personality and
social psychology. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Quillian, M. R. (1969). The teachable language comprehender: A simula-
tion program and theory of language. Communication of the ACM, 12,
459–476.
RatcliV, R., & McKoon, G. (1981). Does activation really spread? Psycho-
logical Review, 88, 454–462.
Roccas, S. (2003). IdentiWcation and status revisited: The moderating role
of self-enhancement and self-transcendence values. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 726–736.
Rohan, M. J. (2000). A rose by any name? The values construct. Personal-
ity and Social Psychology Review, 4, 255–277.
Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York, NY: Free
Press.
Rokeach, M. (1985). Inducing change and stability in belief systems and
personality structures. Journal of Social Issues, 41, 153–171.
Rokeach, M., & Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (1989). Stability and change in Ameri-
can value priorities. American Psychologist, 44, 775–784.
Ross, M., & McFarland, C. (1988). Constructing the past: Biases in per-
sonal memories. In A. W. Kruglanski & D. Bar-Tal (Eds.), The social
psychology of knowledge (pp. 299–314). New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Sagiv, L., & Schwartz, S. H. (2000). Value priorities and subjective well-
being: Direct relations and congruity eVects. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 30, 177–198.
SchonpXug, U. (2001). Intergenerational transmission of values. Journal of
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32, 174–185.
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values:
Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. Zanna
(Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 1–65).
San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and
contents of human values? Journal of Social Issues, 50, 19–45.
Schwartz, S. H., Verkasalo, M., Antonovsky, A., & Sagiv, L. (1997). Value
priorities and social desirability: Much substance, some style. British
Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 3–18.
Thomsen, C. J., Lavine, H., & Kounios, J. (1996). Social value and attitude
concepts in semantic memory: Relational structure, concept strength,
and the fan eVect. Social Cognition, 14, 191–225.
Verplanken, B., & Holland, R. W. (2002). Motivated decision making:
EVects of activation and self-centrality of values on choices and behav-
ior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 434–447.
Whitbeck, L. B., & Gecas, V. (1988). Value attributions and value trans-
mission between parent and child. Journal of Marriage and the Family,
50, 829–840.
Yik, M. S. M., & Tang, C. S. (1996). Linking personality and values. Per-
sonality and Individual DiVerences, 21, 767–774.
